

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 750
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION USNATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BUCHAREST 5183

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: RO UR XH EEWT MARR PARM PINT SHUM CH TW XF YO

SUBJECT: HARRIMAN VISIT -- MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU
AND FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI

1. SUMMARY. DURING ONE AND THREE-FOURTH HOURS EXCHANGE ON
JULY 24 AT ROMANIAN PRESIDENT'S BLACK SEA RESIDENCE, GOVERNOR
AVERELL HARRIMAN AND NICOLAE CEAUSESCU HAD SPIRITED DISCUSSION
OF US RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND USSR, DISARMAMENT, THE MIDDLE
EAST, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, AND BILATERAL ISSUES.
MEETING WAS FOLLOWED BY FRANK LUNCHEON DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN
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MINISTER STEFAN ANDREI. AMBASSADOR WAS PRESENT FOR BOTH
EVENTS, GOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIRECTOR BOGDAN FOR
LATTER. END SUMMARY

2. RECALLING EARLIER VISIT TO ROMANIA IN 1967, HARRIMAN
REITERATED HIS APPRECIATION FOR ROLE GOR PLAYED THEN
IN EFFORTS TO STOP THE VIET-NAM WAR BY SEEKING TO PERSUADE

HANOI TO NEGOTIATE. HE SAID INITIATIVE MIGHT HAVE LED TO PEACE HAD THE US ADMINISTRATION AT THAT TIME SHOWN MORE FLEXIBILITY. CEAUSESCU CHARACTERIZED EVENTUAL CONCLUSION OF PEACE ACCORD AS MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT BUT FELT NEXT IMPORTANT STEP WAS RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF US RELATIONS WITH VIET-NAM. THIS WAS BEING NEGOTIATED BUT NOT WITHOUT PROBLEMS, HARRIMAN SAID. TURNING TO US CONTACTS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, CEAUSESCU STRESSED ROMANIA'S DESIRE FOR EARLY US NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PEKING AND SAID HE FELT US CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION FAVORED SUCH A STEP. HARRIMAN DESCRIBED PERCEIVED OBLIGATIONS AND ATTACHMENTS MANY AMERICANS FELT TO TAIWAN WHICH MADE DECISION MORE COMPLICATED.

3. CEAUSESCU SAID HE ENCOURAGED MORE RAPID NORMALIZATION OF US-CHINA RELATIONS FOR INTRINSIC VALUE OF SUCH FORMAL LINK, NOT TO ESTABLISH A "CHINA CARD" TO PLAY AGAINST SOVIET UNION. SUCH A TACTIC ONLY INFURIATES USSR. ROMANIA FELT STRONGLY US RELATIONS WITH CHINA SHOULD NOT AND COULD NOT BE USED EFFECTIVELY AS A PRESSURE ON USSR. GOOD US RELATIONS WITH BOTH COUNTRIES WOULD SERVE CAUSE OF DETENTE AS WELL AS INTERESTS OF ROMANIANS AND OTHER PEOPLES. CEAUSESCU DID NOT BELIEVE SOVIETS INTENDED TO ATTACK PRC AND HIS DISCUSSIONS IN PEKING MAY HAVE HELPED ALLAY THEIR FEARS ON THIS SCORE.
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4. ON US RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, HARRIMAN EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN WITH CURRENT DETERIORATION DUE TO DISAGREEMENTS OVER DISSIDENT TRIALS. CEAUSESCU WARNED AGAINST EXAGGERATING THESE DISAGREEMENTS AND URGED CANDOR AND COOPERATION IN US-USSR RELATIONSHIPS. HE AGREED WITH HARRIMAN THAT GOOD RAPPORT BETWEEN SECRETARY VANCE AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AUGURS WELL FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF SALT II AGREEMENT.

5. HARRIMAN STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF CONCLUDING SALT II AGREEMENT LEADING TO SALT III AND ENCOURAGING GENERAL EVOLUTION OF LARGER DISARMAMENT PROCESS. CEAUSESCU SAID AGREEMENTS TO DATE FAILED TO STOP CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. IF CURRENT SALT AND MBFR EFFORTS DID NOT COUNTER ARMS RACE, WORLD WOULD SOON FACE DANGEROUS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. HARRIMAN, CITING US PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET ARMS BUILD-UP IN EASTERN EUROPE, ASKED CEAUSESCU TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE USSR TO MOVE AHEAD ON LIMITATION OF BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS. CEAUSESCU AGREED ON NEED TO MOVE AHEAD AND SAID MBFR AGREEMENT ALONG LINES

NOW ADVANCED BY BOTH SIDES, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT REALLY AFFECT FORCES BALANCE, WOULD HAVE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS AND OPEN WAY TO REAL ARMS REDUCTION. HARRIMAN OBSERVED IT WAS HARD TO AVOID BALANCE IN FACE OF MUTUAL DISTRUST. CEAUSESCU SAID US-SOVIET DIFFERENCES SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED TO POINT OF CREATING FALSE IMAGE IN PUBLIC OPINION. EUROPE SHOULD CONSTITUTE FIRST ARMS REDUCTION ZONE UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. HARRIMAN SAID HE FAVORED VERY CLOSE US-ROMANIAN COOPERATION ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES. CEAUSESCU SAID RECENT SSOD HAD POSITIVE RESULTS AND PLEDGED HIS COUNTRY'S FULL COOPERATION IN FRUITFUL DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE WITH US.

6. HARRIMAN SAID RECENT REPORTS INDICATE USSR WISHED
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TO BE MORE INVOLVED IN MIDDLE EAST QUESTION. CEAUSESCU SAID SOVIET UNION HAD ROLE TO PLAY IN MIDDLE EAST, BUT HE FELT MOST IMPORTANT WAS ENGAGEMENT OF SYRIA, THE PALESTINIANS, AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IN THE REGION, ALONG WITH US, ISRAEL AND EGYPT. ISRAEL HAD TO ADOPT MORE REALISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD PALESTINIANS. HARRIMAN NOTED PRESIDENT CARTER'S POSITION THAT PALESTINIANS MUST RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND THAT LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE MUST BE RECOGNIZED. HE URGED CEAUSESCU TO CONTINUE ROMANIA'S ACTIVE AND POSITIVE ROLE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BUCHAREST 5183

IN QUEST OF MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION. DURING LUNCHEON DISCUSSION, ADREI SAID THAT A T SOFIA WARSAW PACT MEETING APRIL 24-25, HE HAD TRIED TO MODERATE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT, BUT GROMYKO TOLD HIM BLUNTLY HE WISHED "TO BURY THE SADAT PROPOSAL."

7. ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, HARRIMAN STRESSED POINT HE HAD MADE DURING HIS JULY 22 TALK AT ROMANIAN ACADEMY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES THAT THERE WAS MOVE TOWARD MORE DIVERSIFICATION OF ECONOMIC POWER IN THE WORLD. WHILE CEAUSESCU FELT MEETINGS LIKE BONN SUMMIT WERE NOT EFFECTIVE IN ADDRESSING PROBLEMS
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OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, HARRIMAN FELT THEY WERE NECESSARY PRELUDE TO MORE EFFECTIVE NORTH DIALOGUE WITH SOUTH.

8. CEAUSESCU REAFFIRMED ROMANIA'S DESIRE TO GAIN ENTRY IN NON-ALIGNED GROUP, NOTING THEY WERE PARTICIPATING AS "INVITED GUESTS" IN MEETING IN BELGRADE THIS WEEK WITH MANY FULL MEMBER STATES WHOSE NON-ALIGNED RECORD ROMANIA CLEARLY BETTERED. HARRIMAN COMPLIMENTED CEAUSESCU ON ROMANIA'S DEVELOPMENT OF ITS INDEPENDENCE OVER LAST TEN YEARS AND FELT THAT ROMANIAN LEADER HAD INCREASINGLY VITAL ROLE TO PLAY IN REGION AS ITS YOUNGEST LEADER AT 60 AND IN VIEW OF TITO'S AGE AND BREZHNEV'S POOR HEALTH.

9. ON YUGOSLAVIA, CEAUSESCU CLAIMED ROMANIA WAS NOT DISTURBED BY SUCCESSION QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA AND SOVIET UNION. CEAUSESCU FELT BELGRADE WOULD CONTINUE TITO'S POLICIES AND EXPRESSED NO GREAT FEARS FOR POST-TITO ERA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE SOVIETS WOULD LAUNCH MILITARY ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA. HE AGREED WITH HARRIMAN'S BELIEF THAT BREZHNEV'S HEALTH WAS POOR, BUT HE FELT SOVIET UNION HAD MANY POLITICAL LEADERS

AND PERSONALITIES AND THAT POLITICS WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY ORIENTATION OF SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY WHICH HE FELT WOULD CONTINUE GENERALLY COOPERATIVE LINE. ANDREI LATER OBLIQUELY EXPRESSED SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT VIEWS FROM THOSE OF HIS PRESIDENT, NOTING DIFFICULTY HE HAD AS ROMANIAN PARTY SECRETARY IN NEGOTIATING WITH SOVIETS AND FACT THAT IN SOVIET UNION YOUNGER LEADERS HE KNEW PERSONALLY HAD ALL LOST THEIR POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE.

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10. TURNING TO BILATERAL RELATIONS, CEAUSESCU WARMLY PRAISED ROMANIA'S IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE USG, INCLUDING EMBASSY BUCHAREST. HE TOLD HARRIMAN HE AND PRESIDENT CARTER HAD ESTABLISHED FRIENDLY RAPPORT, GIVING NEW IMPETUS TO GREAT PROGRESS THAT HAD BEEN MADE OVER PAST FEW YEARS IN EXPANDING COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES AND POLITICAL DIALOGUE. MAIN PROBLEMS FOR ROMANIA WERE GETTING USG APPROVALS FOR TECHNOLOGY ROMANIA WISHED TO IMPORT AND OBTAINING CONCESSIONAL CREDITS FOR PURCHASE OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY. FIRST PROBLEM HAD BEEN ADDRESSED BY PRESIDENT CARTER, CEAUSESCU SAID, BUT ROMANIA WOULD WELCOME HARRIMAN'S HELP ON BOTH PROBLEMS. HARRIMAN NOTED THAT US LEGISLATION LIMITED SOFT LOANS TO LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THAT ROMANIA WAS IN DIFFERENT CATEGORY AND COULD NOT CONSIDER ITS NEEDS AS URGENT AS THOSE OF BANGLADESH, FOR EXAMPLE. LATER HE TOLD ANDREI THAT SOLUTION TO PROBLEM OF CREDITS MIGHT BE MET INDIRECTLY BY INCREASING ROMANIA'S JOINT VENTURES WITH US FIRMS.

11. HARRIMAN STRESSED PRESIDENT CARTER'S ASTUTE ANALYSIS OF PERSONS AND ISSUES AND HIS COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND LESSENING TENSION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. HE PREDICTED SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THE US PRESIDENT EXPERIENCED IN RELATIONS WITH THE CONGRESS WOULD BE RESOLVED AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS. PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU SAID HE REGRETTED HARRIMAN COULD NOT REMAIN LONGER IN ROMANIA, BUT THAT HE SHOULD RETURN SOON AND SUGGESTED HE DO SO ON THE WAY BACK FROM A TRIP TO PEKING. REMEMBERING THE GOOD TALKS HE HAD WITH PRESIDENT CARTER IN APRIL, AND THE GOOD UNDERSTANDINGS THEY REACHED, HE ASKED HARRIMAN TO CARRY TO PRESIDENT CARTER HIS VERY BEST REGARDS AND HIS DESIRE FOR BETTER AND BETTER COOPERATION WITH THE US ON BOTH BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL MATTERS IN THE SPIRIT OF THEIR AGREEMENTS. FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI, IN WALKING HARRIMAN BACK TO HIS VILLA AFTER LUNCH, SAID

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VISIT HAD MEANT GREAT DEAL TO HIM PERSONALLY AND THAT
PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU WAS HIGHLY PLEASED WITH DISCUSSION
HE HAD WITH THE AMERICAN STATESMAN.

12. COMMENT: MEETINGS WERE EXTREMELY RELAXED AND INFORMAL
WITH CEAUSESCU IN VERY AFFABLE MOOD. HE LAUGHED ALMOST
TO TEARS AFTER HARRIMAN'S REVELATION THAT TITO ONCE
TOLD HIM THAT CHINESE CONSIDERED TITO A "REVISIONIST
BANDIT," WHICH ACCORDING TO YUGOSLAV LEADER WAS MUCH
WORSE THAN "IMPERIALIST BANDIT" WITH WHICH HARRIMAN SAID
PEKING HAD BRANDED AMERICANS. ANDREI STATED HE WOULD
ATTEND UN MEETING IN SEPTEMBER AND LOOKED FORWARD TO
SEEING HARRIMAN AGAIN AT THAT TIME.
AGGREY

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